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Response
Alberto Moya Monge

When Antonio Gramsci wrote his prison notebooks between
1929 and 1935, he defined intellectuals as “organizers of masses
of men; organizers of the ‘confidence’ of investors in their business; of the customers of their product.”1 Gramsci must have
envisioned intellectuals such as Benedict Anderson and Edward
Said. More than sixty years after those prison notebooks were
written, and one year after Dr. Said articulated for us the duties
of the intellectuals,2 we gather again at the Macalester International Roundtable to deal with the ideas presented in this session by Dr. Emmanuel Sivan.
Let me begin by thanking Dr. Sivan for giving us a useful
examination of competing and contemporary forces in the Middle East. Much of what I have to say about this subject is the
result of my engagement during the past three years in a variety
of discussions with professors and students from many parts of
the world. It is also the product of years of images fed to me by
newspapers, television newscasts, and magazine articles. The
task at hand, then, is highly challenging, particularly for someone from another part of the world—Central America.
To respond to Dr. Sivan, I will first outline several key contributions of the essay. Second, I will discuss three notable topics
that are conspicuous by their absence from the essay. I will conclude by providing my views on the issues addressed in this
forum and, while doing so, take a brief look at the questions of
identity and globalization raised by this year’s Roundtable.
I. Highlights
A. Dispelling Myths of Pan-Arab Nationalism
Pan-Arab nationalism, Dr. Sivan contends, finds itself at a difficult crossroads in the wake of the end of the Cold War. It takes
only a couple of notable reminders such as the Gulf War to realize the magnitude of the events that have shaken up this particular nationalist movement. Dr. Sivan’s analysis of these points is
83
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best illustrated by systematically dispelling the three pillars, or
“myths,” of pan-Arab nationalism.
The first is the “Arab Piedmont and Prussia” — an ethnic and
cultural nationalist movement designed to unify and create a
collective Arab consciousness transcending political boundaries.3 Egypt’s Nasser, Libya’s Qaddafi, and, ultimately, Iraq’s
Saddam Hussein all failed to use their respective opportunities
to seize potential Arab leadership. Second is the notion of “artificial borders” — a result of imperialism following its dictum of
“divide and conquer.” In its quest for unity, pan-Arab nationalism seeks to erase the political and geographic boundaries created by such “artificial borders.” However, the principles
behind a “nation-state” have created a new consciousness for
entities such as Kuwait, resisting Iraq’s invasion and subsequent
annexation between 1990 and 1991.4 The third and final myth is
that of “common (Arab) interests” — in other words, the pursuit
of a common (Arab) goal or achievement — easily dispelled
when Saudi, Egyptian, and Syrian forces confronted Iraq and its
Arab allies during the Gulf War.
The collapse of these three myths is of great importance
because it leads us toward the questions of identity that the
Middle East was at first reluctant to face, but later took up rather
enthusiastically. Middle Eastern nations, now more than ever,
are facing questions of patriotism and nationalism, concerns that
are in constant redefinition and reformulation in terms of ethnic
identities, loyalties, and territorial demarcations. Scholars on the
Middle East such as Bernard Lewis complement Dr. Sivan’s perspectives on the “vacuum” created by the eminent loss of panArab hegemony and the surge toward the formation of new
nation-states. As Lewis writes,
We have traced the rise and fall of liberal patriotism, the rise and
spread of ethnic nationalism. It remains to glance briefly at the
most recent phase: the return, at first tentative and uncertain and
then increasingly vigorous to a new patriotism based on new
nation-states that are at least beginning to take root in the consciousness and loyalties of their peoples.5

Patriotism and nationalism, in turn, help develop and form
the new “consciousness” and “loyalties” and are constantly fluc-
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tuating as a result of internal struggles of personal and collective
identity. This is best illustrated by Nizzar Qabbani’s poem “Top
Secret Memorandum.”6 This poem embodies the numerous difficulties of defining Arab or Middle Eastern identity—including
dealing with violence, democracy, fear, and extremism. Such
questions remain at hand, and answers still seem difficult to
come by.
B. The Emergence of the Nation-State in the Middle East
A second contribution made by Dr. Sivan’s essay is the analysis
of the emergence of the nation-state in the Middle East. As panArabism declines in force, Dr. Sivan believes, the nation-state
plays a more defining political and social role. He explains how
the rise of the nation-state complements Radical Islam and Middle Easternism. According to Dr. Sivan, both assume “that the
nation-states are the sole effective collective entities in the region
and that they enjoy a substantial measure of legitimacy in the
eyes of their citizens/subjects.”7
Herein we can find some of the best examples of the growing
relationship between the creation of identities and their linkages
with historical roots. Dr. Sivan’s simple but keenly representational examples of tracing collective consciousness through
bank notes, stamps, and holidays illustrate the numerous symbols that connect the self with families, neighbors, citizens of a
particular country. In addition, here cultural and historical identities serve as complements to an overall national consciousness
by passing the legacies of traditions and customs from generation to generation. But such principles are not new. For years,
Islam has played, and still performs, a key role in the legitimization of a national identity. Sylvia Haim writes,
If this bond [Islam] could be strengthened, if it were to become
the spring of [Muslims’] lives and the focus of their loyalty, then
prodigious forces of solidarity would be engendered to make
possible the creation and maintenance of a strong and stable
state.8

Dr. Sivan points out that there is a price tag attached to the
existence of nation-states in the Middle East: a glorification of
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the nation-state can be a major impediment to a vision of a
regional system — a growing imperative in a global order where
transnational life is flourishing on multiple levels or interactions.
C. Radical Islam
Finally, Dr. Sivan spends a great deal of his work examining
what he considers to be the two key participants that will fill the
void left by the collapse of pan-Arab nationalism: Radical Islam
and Middle Easternism. The first seems to capture most of his
attention. Consequently, in an extensive look at Radical Islam,
he displays his acute knowledge of this phenomenon, “the most
dynamic political social force upon the Muslim scene.”9 In a nutshell, Dr. Sivan argues that Radical Islam plays a key role in the
contemporary Middle East because it combines skillful communication techniques with political language embedded in deep
historical roots, passed on through modern media.
The use of an elaborate cultural and religious apparatus
allows Islamic radicals to effectively propagate their ideas
against “West-toxication” (materialism, modernism, and secularism). The elements of this syndrome include moral degeneracy, unemployment, poor housing, and crime. Radical Islam,
Dr. Sivan argues, has come to the fore in the search for a redefinition of the boundaries between the religious and the secular.
II. Shortcomings and Notable Absences
A. Defining the “Middle East”
As I prepared my response, I examined numerous volumes on
this particular region’s historical background. In trying to determine what countries the Middle East comprised, I noticed that
different maps included different countries. Surprisingly, Dr.
Sivan’s essay presented me with a similar problem, for he never
truly defines what he refers to as the “Middle East.” Is it a geographical region? If it is, are its boundaries political, economic,
religious, ethnic, an amalgam of all, or none of the above?
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In 1902, American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan first
coined the term Middle East, which encompassed the area
between Arabia and India and, appropriately for a naval strategist, placed the center in the Persian Gulf. But this crude and
pragmatic definition is only two-dimensional because it does
not address the multiple concerns of politics, society, religion,
and economics. We cannot be limited to such a method. It is
imperative that we revisit the idea of the Middle East and then
present a framework that could allow our ideas and contentions
to interact.
Is the Middle East, then, defined by ethnicity? If not, is it
determined by differences of language and/or religion, or simple territorial demarcation? These questions can certainly produce conflicting answers: people from “within” the Middle East
very possibly see themselves quite differently than do those
who see them from the “outside.”
B. Israel and the Middle East
In the same way that various historical accounts have included
and excluded geographical sections of the region, rather surprisingly, Dr. Sivan has chosen to omit and/or overlook the participation of Israel as a key player in his “Middle East.” Earlier this
year, when I was invited to participate in this discussion, I kept
a close eye on newspaper articles, television news, and anything
related to the subject. From then on, I was bombarded with
news item after news item: Saddam Hussein’s reincursion into
the United Nations’ established no-fly zone, fluctuating oil
prices, images of “extremists” celebrating the burning of Western icons on the street, and the precarious conditions of the
Palestinians. I was captivated by the images emanating from
Israel — the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, terrorist
bombing after terrorist bombing, Yasser Arafat exchanging
words with Shimon Peres, radical groups such as Hamas
proudly claiming responsibility for the deaths of many in the
jihad, or “holy war,” and Israeli force in encounters with Palestinians.
The struggle for land, legitimacy, and life among Palestinians,
other Arabs, and Israelis is certainly not a new one. For nearly
fifty years, the world has seen countless visions of bloodbaths,
87
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gunshots, and bombings that seem almost never-ending. Now
more than ever, these images seem to be escalating to new levels
of despair and terror. NBC News correspondent Martin Fletcher
expressed in one of his reports in September 1996 the frustration
and hopelessness that many of us feel day after day. “Two
weeks ago,” Fletcher said, “Palestinian forces and Israeli troops
were patrolling the zone together . . . today, they were killing
each other.”
After reading Dr. Sivan’s essay, I came away feeling disappointed that none of these images or their huge symbolic importance was invoked. Rather, it seems to me that Dr. Sivan took
the task of examining cultures, politics, nationalities, religions,
and identities other than his own with an omniscient perspective, strangely alienating himself from the complex and interwoven mechanisms that shape and influence life in the Middle
East, including Israel. It is difficult to understand how Dr. Sivan
can seemingly remove himself completely from the historical
context that he is so much a part of. “Know thyself” is a current
running through this year’s Roundtable; I am surprised that Dr.
Sivan has overlooked this suggestion.
C. Globalization and the Middle East
Dr. Sivan’s depiction of the forces at play in the shaping of political, economic, cultural, and religious life are clearly seen as
“internal” or “regional” in character. This approach neglects a
fundamental question presented to each scholar: What is to
become of national belonging and nationalism in a time of both
ascending ethnicity and the onset of globalization?
Dr. Sivan believes that in the midst of the emerging redefinition of nation-states, Radical Islam will succumb as long as it
denies the validity of human rights and rejects democracy. In
addition, in order for Middle Easternism to have validity, it
must be given clearer purpose. Such an effort will involve a
combination of economic elements such as the Middle Eastern
Common Market as well as the application of the politics of resolution embedded in the principles of the New World Order —
both strong counterparts to Radical Islam.
But what about the numerous external forces participating in
the creation and disintegration of transnational life? How are
88
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technological developments such as the transactions of digital
information helping to propagate alternative perspectives other
than Radical Islam and Middle Easternism? Considerations of
this kind seem to be essential in the shaping of a “collective
imagination” that transcends territorial boundaries.
Scholars are no longer asking if globalization is taking place.
Rather, they are now focusing on delineating its complexities as
well as exploring effective responses. Although he does not
directly address the question of globalization, Dr. Sivan does
provide some hints. For example, he warns us about the “Dialogue of Actions”—internal contradictions of hegemonic ideologies that can lead to their own demise. The forces of
globalization will no doubt make the “dialogue” even more
complex if not more conflictive.10
III. Personal Remarks
The questions of identity and ethnicity are not, of course, limited
to the region of the Middle East. For instance, Latin America has
its own struggles over identity. Here, one can pick from a handful of ethnic groups that are seeking recognition and legitimacy
through redress of deep grievances. The most recent and vivid
example is the present uprising in Chiapas, Mexico. In Africa,
communal tensions have, more than once, exploded into “ethnic
cleansing.” And Europe — the ostensible cradle of “civility,”
great thinkers, and Western “Enlightenment”—watched the former Republic of Yugoslavia crumble and give way to a savagery
reminiscent of violent and brutal times past.
Globalization is not limited to the potential openings of common markets or the sharing of capital and information across
political boundaries. It also includes the globalization of problems and a nascent challenge to privileges solely based on racial,
cultural, or religious categories. If we abide by the principles
embodied in emerging transnational life, then the peoples of
every region will have to learn about and deal with the concerns
of the rest. In this regard, the post-Cold War era presents tough
issues that defy easy solutions. But, in the context of the Middle
East, it may be the anxieties of the Muslim countries that are
most disconcerting. Ali Muzrui writes,
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In addition to the black-white divide in the world, Muslim countries, in particular[,] may have reason to worry in the era after the
Cold War. Will Islam replace communism as the West’s perceived adversary? Did the West exploit the Gulf War of 1991 to
put Islam and its holiest places under the umbrella of Pax Americana?11

Finally, Dr. Sivan’s essay is one more reminder of the acute
need for scholars to expand their horizons and seek alternative
perspectives of analysis. Arjun Appadurai recently called for the
use of different dimensions, or “scapes,” for exploring cultural
flow.12 It seems that Dr. Sivan’s essay compels us to approach
the Middle East in a transdisciplinary fashion in which Radical
Islam is seen as a conduit of material concerns, not just a
dynamic cultural movement, and Middle Easternism becomes a
philosophy responding to years of terror and counterterror. Like
every other region of the world, then, the people of the Middle
East face a combination of old difficulties and novel problems.
To mount a successful response will require a monumental
regional effort that links the best of local (e.g., ethnic, religious,
national) solidarity to an inclusive regional communion. A good
beginning into this long journey can be taken by the articulation
of cosmopolitan perspectives by the area’s intellectuals.
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